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Ambedkar’s	Agonism,	Sovereign	Violence	and	Pakistan	as	Peace	
	
Shruti	Kapila	(University	of	Cambridge)	
	 		On	December	16,	1946,	in	his	initial	response	to	Jawaharlal’s	Nehru’s	famous	Objectives	Resolution	that	had	declared	India	a	sovereign	republic,	B.	R.	Ambedkar	found	the	prospective	claim	on	India’s	future	form	as	‘uncontroversial’	if	‘disappointing’.	Asked	to	respond	to	it	by	Rajendra	Prasad	who	was	chairing	the	freshly	formed	Constituent	Assembly,	Ambedkar	recognized	Nehru’s	proclamation	as	akin	to	the	Declaration	of	Rights	of	the	French	Constitution	as	it	focused	on	‘rights’	to	the	exclusion	of	‘remedies’	and	chose	in	return	to	invoke	and	cite	the	French	revolution’s	fiercest	critic	and	the	figurehead	of	British	conservatism,	Edmund	Burke.	Pirating	figures	from	the	canon	of	modern	politics	either	as	evidence,	caution	or	for	insight	into	the	future	political	formation	of	India	had	been	one	of	the	striking	signatures	of	Ambedkar’s	wide-ranging	writings.		This	was	not,	however,	to	seek	the	preservation	of	an	old	order	or	even	to	right	remedies	that	he	indeed	instituted	by	drafting	the	Indian	constitution.	But	by	invoking	Burke,	Ambedkar	alerted	to	the	dangers	of	war	and	violence	in	its	force	and	ability	to	degrade,	waste	and	even	consume	the	very	object	of	contest.	Drawing	attention	to	the	Muslim	League’s	absence	from	the	Assembly,	Ambedkar	clarified	that	the	stakes	of	Hindu	and	Muslim	relations	portended	war	and	peace	with	a	potential	of	perpetual	war	that	could	render	the	object	of	recovery	–	namely	India	–	becoming	entirely	consumed	by	violence.	Ambedkar	concluded	his	short	intervention	by	warning	his	assembled	political	peers	of	their	own	fantasies,		 If	there	is	anybody	who	has	in	mind	the	project	of	solving	the	Hindu-Muslim	problem	by	force,	which	is	another	name	of	solving	it	by	war,	in	order	that	the	Muslims	may	be	subjugated	and	made	to	surrender	to	the	Constitution	that	might	be	prepared	without	their	consent,	this	country	
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would	be	involved	in	perpetually	conquering	them.	This	conquest	would	not	be	once	and	forever.1		While	his	warning	was	met	with	silence	on	that	occasion,	Ambedkar’s	views	ought	to	have	been	familiar	given	that	only	a	few	years	prior	to	this	Assembly	and	in	1940	he	had	published	his	disquisition	on	the	prospect	of	Pakistan.	The	reaction	in	the	Assembly	conformed	to	the	reception	of	this	earlier	explication	of	his	ideas	on	Pakistan.	In	the	second	edition	of	Pakistan	or	the	Partition	of	India,	published	in	1945,	Ambedkar	reprised	what	was	by	his	own	admission	the	‘singular’	nature	of	his	enterprise.	In	the	second	edition	of	his	Pakistan	or	the	
Partition	of	India,	published	in	1945,	Ambedkar	reprised	what	was	by	his	own	admission	the	‘singular’	nature	of	his	enterprise.	His	book	was	‘disowned	by	the	Hindus	and	unowned	by	the	Muslims’,	which	only	emboldened	his	claim	to	non-partisanship	regarding	a	viscerally	divisive	idea	and	history.2			Although	much	belated,	Ambedkar’s	book	on	the	idea	of	Pakistan	is	today	enjoying	a	new	kind	of	attention.	Above	all,	the	book	stands,	as	demonstrated	in	Faisal	Devji’s	Muslim	Zion,	as	a	testament	to	the	triangulated	history	of	the	formation	of	Pakistan	in	that	it	was	conditioned	by	the	caste	question	inasmuch	as	by	the	internationalization	of	the	minority,	thus	refreshingly	enabling	the	understanding	of	the	formation	of	Pakistan	as	an	idea	that	cannot	be	exhausted	by	or	fully	equated	with	the	question	of	religion.3	For	the	more	literal	minded,	it	continues	to	be	marshaled	–-	much	as	it	was	in	the	defining	decade	of	its	initial	publication	--	as	evidence	that	functions	as	proof	in	a	lawyer’s	case	prosecuted	by	the	historian	for	or	against	partition.4																																																									1	B.	R.	Ambedkar	in	the	Constituent	Assembly	of	India	Debates,	Vol.	1	(16	December	1946),	accessed	online	at:	http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol1p6.htm.	On	Jawaharlal	Nehru,	see	Purushotham,	‘World	History	in	the	Atomic	Age’.	On	Ambedkar	and	caste,	see	Rao,	The	Caste	Question,	and	on	his	political	ideas	especially	on	equality	Kumar,	
Radical	Equality	and	Cháirez-Garza,	‘Touching	Space’,	to	cite	selectively	from	a	growing	body	of	works.	On	the	context	and	causes	of	Ambedkar’s	membership	of	the	Assembly	see	Bandyopadhyay,	‘Orchestrating	a	Signal	Victory’. 2	Ambedkar,	Pakistan	or	the	Partition	of	India;	Mood	(ed.),	Dr.	Babasaheb	
Ambedkar	Writings	and	Speeches	[hereafter	BAWS],	Vol.8,	2.	3	Devji,	Muslim	Zion.	4	Dhulipalia,	Creating	A	New	Medina,	123-93.	
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In	focusing	primarily	on	Ambedkar,	this	article	will	reconstruct	and	interpret	the	work	of	hostility	and	antagonism	that	was	central	to	his	political	thought	and	writings.	As	a	thinker,	Ambedkar	remained	singular	in	taking	account	of	the	full	and	potential	measure	of	violence	predominantly	in	caste	relations	but	beyond	in	the	comparative	contexts	of	revolutions	and	formations	of	nation-states	in	the	modern	world.	As	I	have	elaborated	elsewhere,	Ambedkar’s	idea	of	the	political	radically	appraised	the	question	of	social	antagonism	and	converted	inherent	hostility	and	the	potentiality	of	violence	into	institutionalised	competition,	thus	converting	antagonists	into	adversaries.5	In	this	sense	and	in	short,	Ambedkar’s	idea	of	the	political	converted	antagonism	into	agonism,	a	central	theme	of	this	article.	The	political	here	refers	to	the	consideration	and	the	domain	of	power,	conflict	and	antagonism	rather	than	to	either	the	institutional	management	or	representation	of	‘interests’	commonly	understood	as	‘politics’	or	even	as	the	domain	of	deliberation	and	freedom	associated	with	a	wide	range	of	traditions	from	classical	liberalism	to	Hannah	Arendt.6		Strikingly,	Ambedkar’s	book	on	Pakistan	recognised	such	a	distinction	between	the	political	and	politics.	At	one	register,	it	documented	the	detail	of	contentions	that	have	gone	down	in	history	and	historiography	as	‘bargaining	counters’	between	dominant	protagonists	and	parties	ranging	from	a	piece	of	territory	to	institutional	mechanics	and	representation.	Suffused	as	these	were	with	the	instrumentality	of	interest,	and	even	as	Ambedkar	assiduously	recorded	the	contentious	views	and	issues	of	all	parties,	he	rightly	asserted	that	the	book	was	not	simply	‘the	X,	Y,	Z	of	Pakistan.’	In	a	related	register,	Ambedkar’s	book	sought	to	provide	an	analytical	and	conceptual	framework	for	the	issue	of	Muslim	nationality	in	relation	to	the	political	with	the	sub-title	of	the	book	The	
Indian	Political	What’s	What	indeed	betraying	its	intentions	in	as	many	words.		In	his	own	words	then	the	‘analytical	presentation’	of	the	book	intended	‘to	explain	the	A,	B,	C	of	Pakistan.’7	The	following	discussion	will	engage	primarily	with	the	
																																																								5	Kapila,	‘Global	Intellectual	History	and	the	Indian	Political’.	6	Mouffe,	On	the	Political.	But	see	Lukes,	Power	that	integrates	power	with	deliberation	or	aims	to	stitch	the	registers	of	the	political	with	politics.	7	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	2.	
	 4	
second	aspect	elaborating	the	horizons	of	hostility,	the	potentiality	of	war	and	the	promise	of	Pakistan	as	peace.8		Ambedkar	was	a	preeminent	nonviolent	thinker	precisely	because	he	understood	the	full	measure,	potential	and	consequences	of	violence.		Crucially,	unlike	his	global	and	historical	interlocutors	whether	it	was	constitutional	experts	or	Karl	Marx,	the	nation	became	the	identified	container	of	the	political	in	the	form	of	an	agnonistic	and	radical	democracy.	As	opposed	to	cosmopolitanism	for	which	‘humanity’	is	the	basis	of	political	ethics	and	universal	horizon,	for	democracy	‘the	people’	or	popular	sovereignty	remains	the	basic	unit	of	politics.	Ambedkar’s	agonism	was	constitutively	elaborated	and	attached	to	the	question	of	nationality	in	this	crucial	sense	rather	than	to	any	universalistic	framework	or	human	rights	and	is	most	clearly	elaborated	in	his	book	on	Pakistan	inasmuch	as	it	was	by	his	disquisitions	on	caste.	Moreover,	unlike	his	political	rival	Mahtama	Gandhi,	Ambedkar’s	political	vision	was	staked	on	the	reproductive	capacity	of	political	ideas	through	an	institutional	design	in	which	the	subject	--	national	and	dalit	--	was	embedded	in	popular	sovereignty.	Agonism	or	the	recognition	of	hostile	distinctions	as	opposed	to	their	violent	eradication	or	willful	neglect,	in	effect	became	the	nonviolent	condition	for	the	life	of	the	Indian	nation	and	democracy.9	While	cognizant	of	extant	discussions	on	agonism	in	relation	to	democracy	and	liberalism,	this	essay	departs	from	those	perspectives	in	its	focus	on	modern	India.	For	the	modern	West,	the	question	of	agonism	has	re-emerged	after	its	initial	reckoning	by	Nietzsche	to	dislodge	the	coercive	emphasis	of	consensus	in	the	so-called	‘post	political’	era	of	globalization	and	late-capitalism,	enabling	the	recognition	of	distinctions	and	promising	to	renew	liberal																																																									8	Dhulipalia,	Creating	a	New	Medina	deploys	Ambedkar’s	book	precisely	in	the	first	register	and	to	the	exclusion	of	the	conceptual	stakes	and	elaborations,	without	which	it	is	rendered	a	mere	record	and	as	superficial	proof	for	partition.	9	Mouffe,	Agonistics;	for	related	discussions	of	agonism	see	Connolly,	Pluralism,	and	Arendt,	Crises	of	the	Republic.	My	argument	is	also	in	opposition	to	multiculturalism	and	equally	its	Nehruvian	rendition	of	a	‘unity	in	diversity’	that	recognizes	but	renders	distinctions	to	the	cultural	domain.	For	the	contemporary	consequences	of	this	debate	and	Indian	democracy	see	Shruti	Kapila,	‘The	Majority	of	Democracy’,	Social	Text	(Periscope	digital	issue	on	‘Politics	under	Modi’),	February	27,	2015,	https://socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/the-majority-of-democracy/.		
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democracy.10	By	contrast,	the	considerations	of	distinction	--especially	in	their	potential	for	and	forms	of	antagonism	and	hostility	--framed	the	political	foundations	of	India.	In	short,	whether	it	was	a	Gandhi	or	an	Ambedkar	the	consideration	of	violence	in	the	context	of	distinctions	whether	of	caste	or	religion	remained	pre-eminent	and	constitutive	rather	than	one	that	emerged	as	an	after-effect	of	a	history	of	consensus.	Moreover,	and	significantly,	the	question	of	enmity	or	even	antagonism	was	defined	by	intimacy	and	familiarity	rather	than	the	externality	of	the	category	of	the	foreigner	--	however	fabricated	or	invented	--	as	the	potential	enemy	or	oppositional	figure	that	has	animated	modern	political	thought	elsewhere	and	primarily	in	the	modern	West.11		Nevertheless,	the	resurrection	of	the	controversial	works	and	ideas	of	Carl	Schmitt	on	the	dimensions	of	the	political	in	the	contemporary	appraisal	of	both	democracy	and	Communism	on	a	global	stage	is	undeniable.	To	clarify,	for	Schmitt	antagonism	oriented	the	political	horizon	that	was	staked	on	the	distinction	of	the	friend	and	the	enemy	with	the	possible	and	real	destruction	of	the	enemy	as	its	condition.	While	the	salience	of	antagonism	for	the	political	domain	is	integrated	but	the	departure	with	Schmitt	lies	here	primarily	as	for	him	homogeneity	and	unity	are	not	only	inter-changeable	but	are	also	the	ultimate	ends	of	order	and	sovereignty.	He	concluded	his	famous	book	The	
Concept	of	the	Political	quoting	Virgil’s	verse	‘ab	integro	nascitur	ordo’	(‘from	unity/integrity/homogeneity	order	is	born’).12	The	Indian	political	by	its	very	conditions	of	heterogeneity	and	division	militated	against	the	mounting	of	sovereignty	towards	a	homogenous	end	while	retaining	a	focus	on	unity.	Ambedkar’s	agonism	became	a	salient	precept	and	his	critique	of	Vinayak	Savarkar’s	Hindutva	in	this	context,	discussed	below,	remains	instructive.	Precisely	because	Ambedkar’s	political	thought	was	animated	by	questions	of	antagonism	in	relation	to	sovereignty	or	even	unity,	Pakistan	and	its	consideration	proved	to	be	inescapable.		
																																																									10	Honig,	Democracy	and	the	Foreigner;	Tully,	Strange	Multiplicity;	and	Tully,	
Public	Philosophy	in	a	New	Key,	especially	Volume	II.		11	Kapila,	‘A	History	of	Violence’.		12	Schmitt,	The	Concept	of	the	Political,	96.	
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A	Belated	Discovery	of	Sovereignty	The	difference	comes	to	this:	a	community	has	a	right	to	safeguards,	a	nation	has	a	right	to	demand	separation.13	B.	R.	Ambedkar		Ambedkar’s	intervention	was	exemplary	in	noting	that	Pakistan	was	premised	on	the	power	of	the	idea	itself;	this	quality	made	it	not	only	inevitable	but	also	charged	with	a	force	of	persuasion	that	could	not	be	contained	by	discounting	it.	Yet	he	was	precise	in	dating	the	idea	of	Muslim	nationality	to	the	very	recent	past.	Emphasizing	the	somewhat	belated	‘philosophical	justification’	for	Pakistan,	Ambedkar	noted	that	the	imperial	constitutional	parleys	of	the	interwar	period	that	had	structured	political	settlements	and	representation	of	Hindus	and	Muslims	in	the	language	of	‘majority’	and	‘minority’	could	not,	however,	exhaust	let	alone	take	a	full	account	of	the	‘political	sentiment’	of	Muslims.		
	 As	is	well	known,	initial	if	piecemeal	representation	for	Indians	in	the	opening	decade	of	the	twentieth	century	instituted	‘separate	electorates’	for	Hindus	and	Muslims	that	were	amplified	in	periodic	constitutional	discussions	ranging	from	the	future	nature	of	franchise	to	local	body	governance.	It	was	however,	the	Round	Table	discussions	held	at	the	highest	imperial	table	in	1930-32	and	in	London	with	the	British	Prime	Minister	Ramsay	MacDonald	heavily	involved	that	brought	the	question	of	the	minority	to	a	heady	if	divisive	head.14	Ambedkar	at	that	point	raised	the	question	of	the	untouchable	to	be	officially	identified	as	a	‘minority’	in	the	manner	in	which	it	been	designated	for	Muslims.	This	led	to	Gandhi’s	open	debate	with	Ambedkar	with	the	Mahatma	declaring	a	fast	unto	death	until	Ambedkar	dropped	this	demand	altogether.	This	defining	difference	was	ultimately	staked	on	two	issues:	the	boundaries	and	ends	of	what	Hinduism	might	be	and	secondly,	what	might	be	the	best	measures	to	affect	the	end	of	untouchability.	Gandhi	won	then	and	an	entente	between	the	two	men	was	established	through	the	Poona	Pact	(1932)	with	Ambedkar	dropping	the																																																									13	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	327.	14	Sarkar,	Modern	India	a	socio-historical	account	written	from	a	Marxist	perspective	of	nationalist	politics	remains	a	most	exhaustive	account.	
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idea,	at	least	for	that	moment.	Gandhi’s	was	a	pyrrhic	victory.	By	1950,	Ambedkar	had	instituted	not	only	radical	remedies	on	caste	but	decisively	also	prove	to	be	more	influential	as	both	a	thinker	of	Muslim	nationality	while	also	bequeathing	the	institutional	architecture	of	Indian	democracy.15	The	interwar	period	marked	however,	as	it	was	also	by	strife	and	unprecedented	majority-minority	talk	had	crucially	caused	a	breach	in	Muslim	history.	Their	‘philosophical’	discovery	of	national	sentiments	had	irrevocably	transformed	the	political	language	of	their	self-understanding	and	in	their	interface	with	others.	The	‘national	feeling’	prevalent	among	Muslims,	Ambedkar	wrote,	though	recent	was	nevertheless	so	powerful	that	Muslims	were	above	all	no	longer	‘content	to	call	themselves	a	community.’16	The	‘fundamental	difference’	between	this	conception	of	community	versus	that	of	nationality	as	Ambedkar	identified	was	the	category	of	the	people,	--	popular	or	general	will	or	sovereignty	itself.	Hitherto,	he	argued	‘political	philosophers’	had	been	satisfied,	if	not	complacent,	in	recognizing	‘communities’	as	differentiated	but	integral	to	the	political	unit	of	the	‘governed’.	Yet	under	conditions	of	distress,	‘communities’,	he	noted,	had	the	natural	right	to	‘insurrection’	but	were	limited	to	a	search	for	changes	in	the	modalities	of	government.	Thus,	critically,	insurrections	remained	internal	to	a	given	political	dispensation.		Underlying	this	distinction	of	a	right	to	‘insurrection’	towards	a	given	political	order	and	a	‘disruption’	oriented	towards	a	separation	was	a	consideration	of	self-preservation	as	fundamental	to	‘natural	rights’	rather	than	as	a	moral	principle	alone.	Though	Ambedkar	in	this	context	would	lengthily	and	approvingly	cite	the	British	moral	philosopher	Henry	Sidgwick,	he	was	nevertheless	pointing	to	the	limits	of	coercion	and	force	in	maintaining	unity	and	underscored	that	‘disruption’	or	separation	even	in	historically	bounded	units	of	territory	held	together	under	even	patriotic	conditions,	had	potentialities	for	
																																																								15	Kapila,	Violent	Fraternity.	16	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	37.	
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peace	if	destinies	had	become	divergent	so	much	so	that	the	‘true	interests	of	the	whole	may	be	promoted	by	disruption.’17		Moreover,	as	elaborated	below,	Ambedkar	was	equally	fixated	on	the	question	of	violence	both	in	the	maintenance	of	sovereign	order	–	as	it	had	emerged	in	relation	to	caste	–	and	in	its	force	for	disorder,	especially	in	relation	to	Hindu	and	Muslim	relations	in	the	twentieth	century.	As	part	of	his	understanding	on	natural	rights,	however,	Ambedkar	understood	the	generative	power	of	violence.		If	too	few,	in	short,	had	means	to	violence,	as	in	the	case	of	upper	caste	Brahmins,	it	would	militate	against	the	formation	of	and/or	destroy	the	social	order.	Conversely,	if	there	was	widespread	violence,	that	too	would	destroy	the	social	order,	a	condition	he	described	at	length	as	the	state	of	affairs	between	Hindus	and	Muslims	in	interwar	India	and	as	testified	by	his	first	intervention	to	the	Constituent	Assembly	and	will	be	further	elaborated	below.		The	point	of	emphasis	here	is	that	Ambedkar,	unlike	natural	rights	theorists	such	as	Hugo	Grotius	and	even	the	arch	foundational	thinker	of	sovereignty	Thomas	Hobbes,	was	not	seeking	an	Archimedean	point	of	equilibrium	on	the	question	of	violence.18	Instead,	he	was	making	explicit	the	altogether	radical	potential	for	discovering	and	instituting	sovereignty	anew	and	brooked	no	squeamishness	towards	either	the	question	of	separation	or	indeed	violence.	In	such	a	perspective,	Ambedkar	is	less	amenable	to	be	cast	out	as	a	‘communitarian	liberal’	or	a	proponent	of	‘group	rights’.19	Instead,	he	can	more	accurately	be	approached	and	understood	as	a	thinker	of	modern	sovereignty.	For	Ambedkar,	only	the	‘nation’	has	the	‘right	to	disruption’	and	‘secession’,	he	argued,	which	went	far	beyond	any	right	to	insurrection.	This	distinction,	while	being	‘fundamental’,	could	only	be	determined	on	the	basis	of	‘ultimate	destiny’	or	goals.	It	is	in	this	vein,	Ambedkar	concluded,	that	both	‘prudence	and	ethics	demands	that	bonds	shall	be	dissolved’,	so	that	the	potentialities	are	‘freed’	in	such	a	manner	so	as	to	‘pursue	its	[own]	destinies.’	The	nation,	as	opposed	to	community,	Ambedkar	realized,	was	the	crucible	of	the																																																									17	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	327,	citing	Henry	Sidgwick’s	Elements	of	Politics	[1929],	648-49.		18	Tuck,	The	Sleeping	Sovereign;	Strauss,	The	Political	Philosophy	of	Hobbes;	and	Skinner,	‘Hobbes	on	Sovereignty’.		19	Bayly,	Recovering	Liberties;	and	Bajpai,	Debating	Difference.			
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idea	of	the	people,	or	more	precisely	it	was	the	nation	that	converted	‘the	people’	into	a	political	category	and	dislodged	it	from	‘community’.	This	transformation	was	categorically	–	according	to	him	and	as	recognized	later	by	historians	of	nationalism	–	the	work	of	imagination.			 Ambedkar	noted	a	distinct	anticipatory	resoluteness	in	Muslim	political	thought	on	the	question	of	Pakistan.	Noting	surprise	and	even	perplexity	that	Muslim	leadership	‘did	not	press	for	Pakistan’	at	the	Round	Table	negotiations	between	empire	and	its	‘minorities’	in	1930,	he	nevertheless	apprehended	the	interwar	period	as	the	defining	moment	of	departure	in	Muslim	political	aspirations.20	Whether	it	was	the	official	designation	of	majority-minority	or	the	status	of	Indian	Muslims	as	a	‘community’,	neither	of	these,	according	to	Ambedkar,	could	exhaust	the	will	to	a	political	and	distinct	entity	that,	however	belated	it	had	nevertheless	become	salient.	In	a	further	note	that	was	not	generally	accepted	by	his	contemporaries	--or	indeed	--by	the	received	historiography	that	considers	the	arrival	of	Pakistan	as	a	last-ditch	and	tragic	outcome	of	brinksmanship,	Ambedkar	turned	the	conventional	terms	on	their	heads.		While	official	discussions	focused	on	the	colonial	census	that	had	corralled	subjects	into	politically	constituted	‘groups’	rather	than	considering	them	as	people,	this	move	had	an	overwhelming	power	in	determining	the	terms	of	the	debate	that	had	repeatedly	discussed	nationality	as	no	more	than	a	function	of	demographics.21	Its	most	powerful	effect	was	that	the	national	question	was	considered	through	the	prism	of	ideas	of	‘majority’	and	‘minority’.	Strikingly,	Ambedkar	argued	that	once	separate	electorates	had	been	recognized,	the	recognition	of	‘minority’	had,	in	effect,	created	a	‘statutory	majority’.22	To	be	sure,	Ambedkar	dismissed	the	claims	of	the	‘majority’	to	constitute	an	actual	political	unit,	recognizing	that	such	aspirations	were	associated	with	Hindutva.		He	dismissed	these	claims	partly	because	he	recognized	Hindutva’s	then	political	body	Hindu	Mahasabha	as	a	mirror	image	of	the	Muslim	League	and	believed	rather	presciently	that	both	would	disappear	with	the	recognition	of	Pakistan.																																																									20	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	326-28	and	334.	21	Appadurai,	‘Number	in	the	Colonial	Imagination’;	and	more	recently	Devji,	
Muslim	Zion,	49-88.	22	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	107.	
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More	importantly,	as	argued	here,	caste	militated	against	any	imagined	unity	within	the	Hindu	social.	Instead,	the	emphasis	fell	on	the	question	of	the	‘minority’,	and	Ambedkar	understood	the	‘minority’	not	only	in	the	terms	ordained	by	colonial	rule	but	related	centrally	to	hostility	and	violence.	In	the	first	instance,	however,	he	recognized	that	the	national	question	was	of	salience	to	Muslim	political	aspirations	themselves.	Ambedkar	argued	that	‘the	delay	in	discovering	the	philosophical	justification	for	Pakistan	is	[precisely]	due	to	the	fact	that	the	Muslim	leaders	had	become	habituated	to	speaking	of	Muslims	as	a	community	and	as	a	minority.’	To	him	this	‘terminology’	had	taken	Muslim	aspirations	in	a	‘false	direction	and	had	brought	them	to	a	dead	end.’	Moreover,	he	argued	that	while	this	recent	philosophical	discovery	of	Pakistan	represented	‘a	complete	transformation’	amongst	Muslims,	it	was	‘brought	[about]	not	by	any	criminal	inducement	but	by	the	discovery	of	what	is	their	true	and	ultimate	destiny.’23	Staked	on	a	futurity	rather	than	as	the	belated	expression	of	a	repressed	ideal	in	the	subcontinental	script,	Pakistan	as	an	idea	was	not	possessed	by	the	past.	This	was	precisely	because	the	future	by	definition	cannot	be	‘observed’	or	‘checked’	let	alone	‘experienced’	and	futurity	is	thus,	a	feat	of	the	imagination	that	‘breaks	free’	from	‘spatial	controls’.24	Unsurprisingly,	given	the	density	of	imperial	negotiations	and	settlements,	the	territorial	moorings	and	debates	over	Pakistan	have	held	sway	in	received	histories	and	dominant	accounts.	Ambedkar	was	distinctive	in	recognizing	that	more	than	even	a	spatial	idea	or	territorial	telos,	Pakistan	was	staked	on	the	reckoning	of	temporality	that	was	entirely	future-oriented.	Such	a	futurity	was	both	a	break	in	historical	time	as	it	was	a	departure	from	imperium	--	both	Mughal	and	British	--	that	ultimately	conditioned	the	inadequacy	if	not	the	destruction	of	prevailing	categories	whether	of	‘community’	or	‘minority’	that	had	hidebound	Muslim	aspirations.25		In	its	most	recent	appraisal	by	Faisal	Devji,	Pakistan	as	a	political	idea	is																																																									23	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	336-7.	24	Koselleck,	The	Practice	of	Conceptual	History,	87,	and	Hartog,	Regimes	of	
Historicity,	for	two	very	different	treatments	on	temporality	and	political	utopias.		25	I	argue	for	the	centrality	of	Mohammad	Iqbal’s’	philosophical	discovery	of	Muslim	republicanism	that	is	premised	above	all	on	the	rejection	of	both	global	Islam	and	the	Caliphate	and	the	idea	of	the	‘minority’	in	Kapila,	Violent	Fraternity	
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here	too	best	understood	as	the	apprehension	of	the	future.	Radical	in	its	capture	of	an	untold	future,	the	formation	of	Pakistan	was	only	possible,	as	he	argues,	by	the	rejection	of	dominant	political	languages	in	which	putative	attachments	to	soil,	blood	and	even	history	are	forsaken	for	the	negation	of	both	Indian	nationalism	and	imperial	endgames.	For	Devji,	though,	the	emphasis	lies	on	the	postwar	reconstitution	of	the	world	order:	a	Muslim	Zion	or	Pakistan	operates	as	a	fitting	if	contrasting	pair	to	Israel	as	the	‘minority’	form	acquired	the	historical	destiny	of	the	national.26		In	the	identification	of	destiny	or	even	the	future	as	the	vantage	point	of	Pakistan,	Ambedkar	would	however,	reprise	contemporary	and	comparative	history	and	equally	ancient	Indian	history	to	discover	and	uncover	the	basis	of	sovereign	power	and	its	effects.	In	short,	in	separate	disquisitions	on	caste	Ambedkar	sought	to	explicate	the	historical	and	Indian	sovereign	order	especially	in	relation	to	violence.	Such	an	uncovering	was	ultimately	directed	towards	securing	new	and	nonviolent	political	foundations	for	India	with	direct	consequences	for	his	considerations	of	Pakistan	and	thus	these	must	be	apprised	here.		 For	Ambedkar,	caste	portended	the	historical	horizon	of	both	extreme	separation	and	deep	sovereignty.	Unlike	dominant	discussions	on	caste	and	Ambedkar	that	take	the	figure	of	the	dalit	or	untouchable	as	central,	the	focus	here	is	on	the	Ambedkar’s	rendition	of	the	Brahmin	as	a	dispersed	monarchy	shrouded	in	violence,	and	in	the	policing	of	separation	between	Brahmins	and	others	that	he	sought	to	not	only	uncover	but	undo.		
The	Sovereign	Order	of	Caste	The	Nazis	had	indeed	a	great	deal	to	learn	from	the	Hindus.	If	they	had	adopted	the	technique	of	suppressing	the	masses	devised	by	the	Hindus	they	would	have	been	able	to	
																																																								26	Devji,	Muslim	Zion.	See	also	Zaman,	Futurity	and	the	Political	Thought	of	North	
Indian	Muslims,	and	Hussain,	Legal	Antagonism	and	the	Making	of	Muslim	
Political	Thought	in	India.	
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crush	the	Jews	without	open	cruelty	and	would	have	also	exhibited	themselves	as	humane	masters.27	B.	R.	Ambedkar	 		In	the	mid-twentieth	century	world-historical	context	of	Nazism	and	the	holocaust,	Ambedkar	elaborated	the	nature	of	violence	that	premised	and	had	made	perpetual	the	power	of	the	Brahmin.	Designating	the	Brahmin	as	Superman,	the	Hindu	social	for	Ambedkar	was,	‘nothing	but	Nietzsche’s	Gospel	put	in	action.’	In	tackling	the	issue	of	violence	and	power,	Ambedkar	uncovered	the	Brahmin	as	sovereign	but	importantly	not	in	the	form	of	a	king	or	monarch.	In	other	words,	in	Ambedkar’s	rendition	of	caste,	the	Brahmin	had	emerged	as	the	Superman,	a	figure	who	could	kill	but	not	die.	In	so	doing,	he	elaborated	the	question	of	violence	as	historically	systemic	by	pointing	out	to	its	means,	instruments	and	ends.			 In	showing	the	intersection	between	Nietzsche’s	idea	of	the	Superman	and	the	Brahmin,	as	well	as	the	catastrophe	of	violence	that	this	idea	entailed,	Ambedkar	starkly	articulated	the	position	of	the	untouchable.	‘As	against	the	Superman,’	the	untouchable,	‘has	no	right	to	life,	liberty	or	property	or	the	pursuit	of	happiness.	He	must	be	ready	to	sacrifice	everything	for	the	sustenance	of	the	life	and	dignity	of	the	Superman.’	The	question	of	sacrifice	here	was	understood	in	terms	of	life	itself.	In	fact,	the	untouchable	was	inculcated,	as	he	wrote,	with	the	belief	that	he	should	‘respond	to	such	call	for	sacrifice	in	the	interest	of	the	superman	as	his	supreme	duty.’28		The	ability	to	take	life,	in	other	words,	was	at	the	core	of	the	Brahmin	as	sovereign.	By	contrast,	as	he	wrote,	‘The	Untouchables	are	the	weariest,	most	loathed	the	most	miserable	people	that	history	can	witness.	They	are	a	spent	and	sacrificed	people.’29	Whereas	Nietzsche	was	interested	in	creating	a	brave	new	‘race’,	the	Hindu	order	of	things	was,	as	Ambedkar	argued,	‘interested	in	maintaining	the	privilege’	of	the	Brahmin	who	had	‘come	to	arrogate	to	itself	the																																																									27	Ambedkar,	India	and	the	Pre-Requisites	of	Communism	[n.d.	published	posthumously]	in	BAWS	Vol.	3,	127.	28	Ambedkar,	India	and	the	Pre-Requisites	in	BAWS	Vol.3,	116	and	123.	29	Ambedkar,	‘Frustration’	in	‘Miscellaneous	Notes’,	Unpublished	Writings,	in	
BAWS	Vol.12,	733.	
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claim	of	being	Superman.’30	While	it	is	out	of	bounds	for	this	discussion,	it	is	important	to	point	out	that	Ambedkar	had	repeatedly	dismissed	caste	as	a	form	of	race	and	had	disputed	colonial	ethnographers	and	emerging	anthropological	debates	on	the	same.31	Equally,	for	Ambedkar,	caste	was	unique	to	India	and	a	formation	that	as	he	pointed	out	‘marks	off	Hindus	from	other	peoples.’32		 The	arrogation	of	the	Brahmin	as	sovereign	was	an	outcome	of	a	regicide.	In	the	depth	of	India’s	antiquity	lay	the	origins	of	the	Brahmin’s	power	that	had,	in	the	first	instance,	emerged	through	the	killing	of	a	Buddhist	king.33	This	turn	to	history	by	Ambedkar	was	not	an	antiquarian	interest	or	a	recuperative	exercise.	Like	other	ideologues	of	the	period,	be	it	B.	G.	Tilak	or	Jawaharlal	Nehru	and	indeed	Savarkar,	history	was	the	template	through	which	political	futures	were	imagined.	Importantly,	as	he	explained,	this	history	of	regicide	is	‘even	more	than	a	past	[but]	of	the	present.	It	is	a	‘living	past’	and	therefore	as	really	present	as	any	present	can	be.’34		It	is	striking	that	Ambedkar	interprets	India’s	past	and	the	destruction	of	Buddhism	in	particular	as	constitutive	of	the	violent	power	of	the	Brahmin	as	sovereign.	With	rhetorical	flourish	and	considerable	conviction	and	in	contrast	to	Hindutva	narratives	of	history	and	their	focus	on	the	oppressive	nature	of	Muslim	rule	Ambedkar	wrote,		‘[T]he	effects	of	Muslim	invasions	on	Hindu	India	have	been	really	superficial	and	ephemeral.	The	Muslim	invaders	destroyed	only	the	outward	symbols	of	Hindu	religion	such	as	temples	and	Maths	etc.	They	did	not	extirpate	Hinduism	nor	did	they	cause	any	subversion	of	the	principles	or	doctrines	which	governed	the	spiritual	life	of	the	people…To	alter	the	metaphor	the	Muslims	only	stirred	the	waters	in	the	bath	and	that	too	only	for	a	while.	Thereafter	they	got	tired	of	stirring	and	left	the																																																									30	Ambedkar,	India	and	the	Pre-Requisites	in	BAWS	Vol.3,	116.	31	See	for	instance	‘Brahmins	versus	Kshatriyas’	in	BAWS	Vol.3,	419,	whereby	Ambedkar	argues	that	Aryans	were	not	a	race.	He	also	argued	that	there	were	no	racial	differences	between	Brahmins	and	untouchables.	Ambedkar,	Who	are	the	
Untouchables	in	BAWS	Vol.7,	242,	303-7.	32	Ambedkar,	India	and	the	Pre-Requisites	in	BAWS	Vol.3,	141	33	Ambedkar,	Revolution	and	Counter-Revolution	in	India	in	BAWS	Vol.3,	269-70.	34	Ambedkar,	‘Manu	and	the	Shudras’	in	BAWS	Vol.12,	719.	
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water	with	sediments	to	settle…	[In	contrast]	…Brahmanism	in	its	conflict	with	Buddhism	made	a	clean	sweep.	It	emptied	the	bath	with	the	Buddhist	Baby	in	it	and	filled	the	bath	with	its	own	waters	and	in	it	its	own	baby.’35		The	question	of	Hindus	and	Muslims	was	not	necessarily	an	antagonistic	one	for	Ambedkar,	primarily	due	to	their	common	historic	experience	as	rulers;	this	tied	them	symbolically,	at	the	very	least.	More	significantly,	caste	and	especially	the	power	of	the	Brahmin	had	remained	intact	despite	the	change	in	imperial	dispensations.		Unlike	the	Hindutva	thinker	Savarkar,	in	turning	to	history	the	aim	was	not	to	forge	antagonisms	anew	but	rather	to	explain	the	source,	preservation	and	perpetuation	of	sovereign	power.	It	is	in	this	context	that	Ambedkar	identified	Buddhism	rather	than	Islam	as	the	critical	point	of	antagonism	in	relation	to	Hinduism.		 ‘The	history	of	India’,	Ambedkar	wrote,	‘is	nothing	but	a	history	of	mortal	conflict	between	–	Buddhism	and	Brahmanism.’	The	regicide	of	the	Buddhist	king	Pushyamita	and	the	destruction	of	the	Buddhist	state	in	the	classical	past	were	understood	by	Ambedkar	as	the	originary	moment	of	the	installation	of	the	Brahmin	as	sovereign.	A	key	consequence	was	the	promulgation	of	caste	laws	and	taboos	as	enshrined	by	Manu	that	had	made	untouchability	permanent.	Ambedkar	delineates	and	details	several	features	of	this	problem	in	which	Brahminism	was	deemed	the	‘counter-revolution’	to	the	Buddhist	‘revolution’	in	India.	Equally	he	raises	the	problem	of	the	historic	conflict	between	Brahmin	and	Kshatriyas	(the	warrior	caste)	especially	on	the	question	of	kingship	and	power.	Three	related	issues	that	emerge	from	Ambedkar’s	disquisitions	are	pertinent	here.		 In	the	first	instance,	and	as	a	consequence	of	the	regicide,	taboos	and	codes	between	castes	were	redistributed	especially	in	relation	to	the	rights	to	bear	arms.	According	to	Ambedkar,	the	taboo	on	Brahmins	to	bear	arms	and	hold	kingly	power	was	lifted.36	Moreover,	the	Brahmin	was	made	immune	from																																																									35	Ambedkar,	Revolution	and	Counter-Revolution	in	BAWS	Vol.3,	274.	36	Ambedkar,	Revolution	and	Counter-Revolution	in	BAWS	Vol.3,	267,	269-71	and	276-7.	
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capital	punishment,	regardless	of	the	crime	he	had	committed.37	The	right	to	bear	arms	and	to	rule	was	further	amplified	for	the	Brahmin	by	the	rights	to	regicide	and	rebellion.	Critically,	however,	these	rights	were	circumscribed	by	the	condition	that	they	could	only	be	invoked	when	the	(kshatriya)	king	or	ruler	had	failed	to	uphold	the	social	order.38	Thus	the	king	or	ruler	became,	as	Ambedkar	put	it,	‘liable	for	prosecution	and	punishment	like	a	common	felon.’39	With	the	destruction	of	Buddhism,	codes	and	taboos	enshrined	and	embedded	the	sovereignty	of	the	Brahmin	and	consequently	made	the	question	of	direct	ruler-ship	or	kingship	not	irrelevant,	but	more	precisely	suborned	the	king	to	the	Brahmin.	Secondly,	a	separation	was	forged	between	Brahmin	and	non-Brahmins.	Through	the	principles	of	‘graded	inequality’,	the	foundational	source	of	separation	and	its	outcome	was	the	disarming	of	the	Shudra,	who	was	not	only	deprived	of	means	to	violence	by	the	restriction	on	the	right	to	bear	arms,	but	was	effectively	barred	from	any	form	of	self-protection.40	A	division	not	only	of	labor	or	occupation	held	isolation	and	fixity	that	had	formed	the	nature	and	principles	of	the	Hindu	social	but	ultimately	was	vested	in	violence	as	a	fundamental	aspect	of	sovereignty.	With	nuance	and	complexity,	Ambedkar	outlined	how	the	erstwhile	hostility	between	Kshatriyas	and	Brahmins	was	converted	into	an	‘entente’	that	ultimately	closed	off	the	ranks	of	power	to	the	lower	orders	and	the	shudras	in	particular.41		In	short,	this	originary	regicide,	with	the	consequent	redistribution	of	ritual	and	sacramental	power,	had	two	enduring	effects.	While	it	diluted	the	sovereignty	of	the	king,	it	also	made	the	king	dependent	on	the	Brahmin.42	Equally,	it	totalized	and	controlled	the	instruments	and	means	of	violence	against	others	and	in	the	end	made	a	group	(or	varna)	into	the	untouchable	(caste).	For	after	all,	as	Ambedkar	argued,	the	shudras	were	once	warriors	and																																																									37	Ambedkar,	‘Manu	and	the	Shudras’	in	BAWS	Vol.12,	722.	38	Ambedkar,	Revolution	and	Counter-Revolution	in	BAWS	Vol.3,	277.	39	Ambedkar,	India	and	the	Pre-Requisites	in	BAWS	Vol.3,	124-5.	40	Ambedkar,	India	and	Pre-Requisites	in	BAWS	Vol.3,	26,	and	Revolution	and	
Counter-Revolution	in	same	volume,	308-20.	41	Ambedkar,	Revolution	and	Counter-Revolution	in	BAWS	Vol.3,	392-415.	42	Ambedkar	describes	the	difficulty	of	Shivaji’s	coronation	and	the	conflict	of	Kshatriyas	and	Brahmins	in	Who	are	the	Shudras,	BAWS	Vol.7,	175-85.	
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through	internecine	warfare	and	as	an	outcome	of	the	banishment	of	Buddhism	were	reduced	to	the	lowest	and	the	most	abject	subjects	of	Hinduism.	The	Buddhist	commitment	to	nonviolence	had	nevertheless	produced	new	norms	for	the	Brahmin,	especially	in	relation	to	meat-eating,	which	were	projected	outward	and	deployed	against	the	untouchable.43	So	the	Brahmin	incorporated	principles	of	nonviolence	from	the	very	regime	of	Buddhism	that	he	displaced,	with	strict	taboos	on	vegetarianism.	This	allowed	for	the	Brahmin	to	emerge	sovereign,	but	without	killing,	or	indeed,	dying,	and	was	ensured	as	an	immortal	rather	than	a	sleeping	sovereign.	Finally,	unlike	other	versions	of	kingship	(Western	and	Islamic)	that	derived	some	of	their	status	from	the	divine,	the	laws	of	Manu,	as	interpreted	by	Ambedkar,	had	made	caste	divine	but	crucially	not	kingship.	Caste,	he	wrote,	‘is	sacred,	not	open	to	abrogation,	amendment	and	not	even	to	criticism.’44	Through	this	three-tiered	approach,	where	the	Brahmin	had	the	capacity	to	punish	and	even	kill	the	king,	with	no	means	of	violence	or	rebellion	left	to	the	lower	orders	and	with	caste	as	the	dispensation	of	the	divine,	the	Brahmin	emerged	as	sovereign	though	not	singularized	as	the	monarch.	This	made	the	power	of	the	Brahmin	perpetual	with	the	responsibility	of	the	social	deposited	on	the	king.	Significantly,	the	‘social’	was	not	only	isolated	and	separate	in	nature	but	incorporated	the	diffused	monarchy	of	the	Brahmin.		Such	an	interpretation,	while	it	was	directed	towards	the	problem	of	untouchability	in	India,	nevertheless	helps	explain	the	context	of	the	formation	of	the	republic	in	India.	As	argued	elsewhere,	the	republic	would	not	be	a	question	of	simply	displacing	the	various	kings	and	princes	or	monarchy.	It	would	require	another	equally	ambitious	task,	namely	the	creation	of	the	‘people’	or	a	fraternity	that	could	only	be	possible	under	democratic	conditions.	For	a	fraternity	to	be	constituted,	Ambedkar	identified	the	antagonism	and	violence	between	the	Brahmin	and	the	untouchable	as	the	crucible	of	sovereignty	in	India.	Indeed,	according	to	Ambedkar,	Brahminism	was	the	counter-revolution	to	the	revolution	of	Buddhism	that	had	enshrined	equality	and	nonviolence.	This	identification	of	a	dispersed	sovereign	order	rather	than																																																									43	Ambedkar,	Who	are	the	Shudras	in	BAWS	Vol.7,	318-55.	44	Ambedkar,	India	and	the	Pre-Requisites	in	BAWS	Vol.3,	127.	
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the	figure	of	the	king	or	monarch	explained	the	perpetual	and	systemic	power	of	the	caste	system	which	was	bounded	in	violence.	Ambedkar,	with	polemical	flourish	wrote	that	this	system	was	perfected	to	the	extent	that	the	Nietzschean	doctrine	of	‘Realize	the	ideal	and	idealize	the	real’	had	been	actualized	in	India.45	As	a	‘permanent	difficulty’,	caste	cut	through	time’s	arrow	of	the	present	and	the	past.46	Historically	understood,	the	question	of	caste	(Brahmin)	as	sovereign	power	and	its	perpetuation	was	thus,	neither	a	doctrine	of	‘social	utility’,	nor	of	‘individual	justice’.	In	short,	caste	was	understood	as	political	in	the	stark	sense	as	it	was	preoccupied	with	and	cohered	by	the	question	of	violence	and	power.	This	is	precisely	why	he	compared	caste,	how	so	ever	heuristically,	with	Nazism.	The	critical	point	of	departure	was,	as	pointed	out	in	the	epigram	above,	that	the	violence	of	caste	was	at	once	hidden	as	it	was	obvious.	Deploying	the	modern	triad	of	politics	in	relation	to	caste	and	Hinduism,	Ambedkar	denounced	it	as	‘inimical	to	equality,	antagonistic	to	liberty	and	opposed	to	fraternity.’47		Systemic,	with	ritual	and	sacrament	as	legitimacy,	comprising	the	denial	of	freedom	of	opportunity	and	knowledge	and,	above	all,	the	right	to	bear	arms,	caste	was	not	only	a	‘cruel	wrong’	but	was	also	the	‘most	shameless	method	of	preserving	the	established	order’	and	power.48	While	the	lower	and	subjugated	orders	experienced	this	powerful	order	of	things	as	‘fate’	there	was	indeed	nothing	random	about	caste.	Delinking	the	arbitrariness	of	fortune	and	fate	that	is	inherent	to	the	understanding	of	violence	and	power,	Ambedkar	instead	denaturalized	the	familiar,	accepted	and	consensual	understanding	of	caste.49	Through	a	study	of	the	classical	past	or	what	he	termed	the	‘exhumation	of	debris’,	of	Ancient	Indian	history,	Ambedkar	understood	that	violence	was	not	necessarily	equal	to	power.	Instead,	in	so	doing	he	uncovered	an	argument	that	if	means	and	instruments	were	the	categorical	condition	of	violence,	then	caste	was	not	a	social,	but	a	political	doctrine	that	controlled	and	monopolized	violence.																																																									45	Ambedkar,	Philosophy	of	Hinduism	in	BAWS	Vol.3,	67.	46	Ambedkar,	Who	are	the	Shudras	in	BAWS	Vol.7,	16.	47	Ambedkar,	Philosophy	of	Hinduism	in	BAWS	Vol.3,	71	and	66.	48	Ambedkar,	India	and	the	pre-Requisites	in	BAWS	Vol.3,	126.	49	On	fortune	and	the	arbitrary	nature	of	violence,	see	Arendt,	On	Violence,	4-5.	
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The	past,	in	this	sense,	for	Ambedkar,	most	overtly	carried	revolutionary	potential.	Above	all,	this	allowed	Ambedkar	to	identify	that	the	source	of	sovereignty	in	India	lay	with	the	Brahmin.	Precisely	because	caste	militated	against	fraternity	and	also	because	the	Brahmin	was	dispersed,	yet	located	above	the	monarch,	the	discovery	of	the	‘people’	became	essential	to	Ambedkar’s	political	project.	This	was	because,	unlike	the	French	revolution,	there	was	no	automatic	replacement	of	the	singular	monarch	or	sovereign	with	the	general	will.		 A	revolutionary	discovery	of	the	people	or	the	commitment	to	the	idea	of	the	republic	premised	on	popular	will	was	expressed	more	forcefully	and	fully	on	discussions	of	nationality.	The	question	of	nationality	renewed	the	question	of	the	recognition	of	difference	that	had	marked	the	infamous	hostility	of	relations	between	Gandhi	and	Ambedkar.	The	entente	between	the	two	political	rivals	was	not	only	short-lived	but	destroyed	and	made	redundant	in	the	making	of	a	new	and	powerful	political	language	of	both	nonviolence	and	nationality	especially	in	relation	to	Muslims.	Significantly,	it	was	not	only	a	question	of	the	nation	but	of	the	‘people’	or	popular	will	and	sovereignty	itself.	This	question	entailed	not	only	the	question	of	the	historic	source	of	sovereignty	but	also	demanded	the	recognition	of	a	new	nationality	and	its	‘people,’	namely	Pakistan.			
Pakistan	and	Peace		If	Pakistan	has	the	demerit	of	cutting	away	parts	of	India,	it	has	also	the	merit	of	introducing	harmony	in	place	of	conflict.50	 B.	R.	Ambedkar		If	Ambedkar’s	discussion	of	caste	uncovered	the	violent	source	of	sovereignty	in	India,	then	it	is	striking	that	the	question	of	Pakistan,	on	the	contrary,	opened	up	for	him	the	possibility	of	peace	between	Hindus	and	Muslims.	While	considering	the	respective	‘Hindu’	and	‘Muslim’	cases	for	and	against	Pakistan,	Ambedkar	reprised	the	recent	history	of	relations	between	the	two	and	their																																																									50	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	220.	
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representatives.	Armed	with	a	battery	of	statistics	of	killings,	Ambedkar	noted	that	the	interwar	period	had	seen	Hindus	and	Muslims	‘engaged	in	a	sanguinary	warfare’.	The	high	nationalist	era	or	the	decades	from	1920-40,	despite	Gandhi’s	efforts	to	‘bring	unity’,	Ambedkar	argued,	had	been	an	era	of	‘civil	war	between	the	Hindus	and	Muslims	of	India’	that	was	only	‘interrupted	by	brief	intervals	of	armed	peace.’	By	the	critical	moment	at	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War,	‘the	‘depth	of	antagonism’	had	ensured	that	the	‘mirage’	of	Hindu-Muslim	‘unity’	had	vanished	and	was	both	‘out	of	sight	and	also	out	of	mind.’51	With	this	context	before	him,	Ambedkar	examined	the	question	of	unity	and	separation	once	more,	setting	out	the	relationship	in	terms	of	the	social	and	the	political	in	the	same	manner	in	which	he	had	posed	the	question	of	caste.		 The	issue	of	the	social	and	political	–	especially	as	it	was	couched	in	terms	of	the	possibility	of	union	and	separation	on	the	issue	of	Pakistan	–	emerged	in	Ambedkar’s	book	in	direct	contrast	to	the	case	of	caste.	As	we	have	seen,	caste	for	Ambedkar	was	a	political	union	bound	in	graded	sovereignty	marked	by	the	divine	dispensation	of	social	separation.	By	contrast,	Hindus	and	Muslims	had	maintained	a	complex	social	union	through	their	long	history.	Yet	in	the	contemporary	era	of	the	nation-state,	their	social	relationship	defied	being	translated	into	a	political	union.52	And	what	is	equally	staggeringly	singular,	but	which	generally	goes	unnoticed	is	that	Ambedkar	marked	out	M.	A	Jinnah	--so	often	seen	as	the	arch	manipulative	leader	of	the	times	--as	entirely	‘incorruptible.’53	The	question	of	Muslim	nationality	as	a	politically	separate	force	was,	in	Ambedkar’s	eyes,	not	an	outcome	of	cynical	machination	or	bad	faith.	 Since	the	days	of	the	Poona	Pact	at	least,	the	concept	of	separation	did	not	in	itself	cause	anxiety	or	squeamishness	in	Ambedkar.	In	the	context	of	the	Round	Table	Conference	and	the	Pact,	he	had	certainly	argued	that	Hindus	and	Muslims,	unlike	Dalits,	were	estranged,	but	not	imperatively	separate.	He	did	not	revise	this	position	or	argue	in	the	imperial	mode	that	Hindus	and	Muslims	were																																																									51	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	184	and	186-7.	52	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	26-35.	53	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	328.	He	further	dismissed	Gandhi’s	claim	that	Jinnah	did	not	represent	all	Muslims	of	India	and	went	as	far	as	to	say	that	‘Never	before	was	Mr.	Jinnah	a	man	of	the	masses.’	Ibid.,	407.	
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primordially	distinct	and	separate	so	that	the	newly	articulated	Muslim	demand	for	the	nation	state	simply	enabled	Muslims	to	fulfill	their	separate	historical	destiny.		In	contrast	to	the	caste	question,	Ambedkar	recognized	that	Hindus	and	Muslims	had	a	long	history	of	what	he	termed	social	union.	Whether	it	was	language,	‘race’	or	custom,	he	argued	that	there	was	considerable	commonality	between	Hindus	and	Muslims	and	in	several	social	and	cultural	respects,	their	relations	were	‘honeycombed.’	Yet	it	was	history	and	particularly	the	‘inability	to	forget’	that	militated	against	a	political	union	between	Hindus	and	Muslims.	Building	on	the	insights	once	more	of	the	French	experience	–	and	in	particular	the	nineteenth	century	philosopher	Ernest	Renan’s	works	on	nationality	and	nationalism	–	Ambedkar	posited	the	necessity	of	forgetting	the	past	to	constitute	a	national	union.54	Unlike	other	nationalists,	whether	a	Nehru	or	a	Savarkar,	who	turned	to	history	to	testify	to	India’s	credentials	for	modern	nationality,	for	Ambedkar	the	hold	of	history	had	become	an	impediment	to	any	union	between	Hindus	and	Muslims.		‘The	crux	of	the	problem’,	Ambedkar	wrote,	was	that	‘common	historical	antecedents’	were	difficult	to	‘share	together.’	Whether	it	was	shrouded	in	violence	or	past	ruler-ship,	history	had	become	the	insuperable	obstacle.	‘The	pity	of	it	is’,	he	wrote	‘that	the	two	communities	can	never	forget	or	obliterate	their	past.’	He	cited	Renan	who	had	argued	that	‘deeds	of	violence	have	taken	place	at	the	commencement	of	all	political	formations’,	even	those	whose	‘consequences	have	been	most	beneficial.’	Yet,	as	Renan	wrote,	and	Ambedkar	repeated,	it	was	‘forgetfulness	and	I	shall	even	say	historical	error,	[that]	form	an	essential	factor	in	the	creation	of	a	nation.’55	The	Hindus	and	Muslims,	Ambedkar	surmised,	had	‘no	such	longing’	whereby	the	past	and	its	antagonisms	could	be	forgotten	in	the	forging	of	a	union.56		
																																																								54	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	32-6.		55	Ernest	Renan	cited	in	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	35-7.	See	Balibar,	Violence	and	
Civility,	for	a	recent	appraisal	on	originary	violence	and	its	conversion	to	political	order,	historicity	and	civility.	56	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	37.	Here	he	cited	the	question	of	‘invasions’	and	the	fear	of	becoming	mere	subjects	as	critical	to	Hindu	and	Muslim	anxieties	that	were	rooted	in	history,	see	ibid.,	49.	
	 21	
The	implication	was	that	in	the	case	of	caste,	history	had	obfuscated	and	repressed	the	true	nature	of	sovereignty	that	Ambedkar	assiduously	revealed.	By	contrast,	for	Hindus	and	Muslims,	the	past	was	ever-present	and	constantly	articulate,	allowing	little	or	no	capacity	for	its	own	repression.	Such	repression	and	forgetting,	had	it	existed,	would	have	enabled	the	suturing	of	violent	past	events	and	the	creation	of	a	new	relationship	of	unity.	But	this	was	now	not	to	be.		 The	power	of	history	coupled	with	the	‘tyranny’	of	numbers	had	rendered	the	Hindu-Muslim	relations	hostile	and	antagonistic.	The	‘communal	problem’	was	not	a	matter	of	disposition,	whether	this	was	the	much-rehearsed	polemics	of	‘insolent’	demands	and	‘meanness’	on	the	part	of	either	Muslims	or	Hindus.	Instead,	Ambedkar	directly	addressed	the	question	of	majority	and	minority	and	the	potentiality	of	violence	and	through	it,	peace.			It	[the	communal	problem]	exists	and	will	exist	wherever	a	hostile	majority	is	brought	face	to	face	against	a	hostile	minority.	Controversies	relating	to	separate	vs.	joint	electorates,	controversies	relating	to	population	ratio	vs.	weightage	are	all	inherent	in	a	situation	where	a	minority	is	pitted	against	a	majority.	The	best	solution	of	the	communal	problem	is	not	to	have	two	communities	facing	each	other,	one	a	majority	and	other	a	minority,	welded	in	the	steel	frame	of	a	single	government.57		As	this	extract	clarifies,	the	coercion	or	‘steel	frame	of	a	single	government’	could	not	on	its	own	resolve	the	depth	of	antagonism	nor	the	powerful	will	to	nationhood	which	was	present	on	both	sides.	In	fact,	the	political	mechanisms	described	by	Ambedkar	as	‘controversies’	would	only	create	conditions	in	which	hostility	would	be	perpetuated.		In	Ambedkar’s	reckoning,	these	relations	between	Brahmins	and	untouchables	and	Hindus	and	Muslims	were	mirror	opposites.	A	separation	founded	on	and	preserved	in	violence	had	constituted	the	order	of	things	for	caste.	The	work	of	the	republic,	then,	would	be	to	ensure	that	even	though	castes	could	not	be	‘dissolved’	a	relationship,	however	competitive	and	adversarial,																																																									57	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	111.	
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could	be	established	between	castes	that	had	hitherto	been	marked	only	by	separation.	By	contrast,	while	a	density	of	social	relationship	indeed	existed	between	Hindus	and	Muslims,	their	antagonism	when	encountered	could	not	be	sublimated	but	only	expressed	in	violence.	From	his	work	on	Pakistan,	it	is	clear	that	political	separation	for	Ambedkar	offered	the	possibility	of	peace.	‘Integral	India’,	he	concluded	was	‘incompatible	with	an	independent	[India]	or	even	with	India	as	a	dominion.’		The	antagonism	between	Hindus	and	Muslims,	as	Ambedkar	interpreted	it,	was	not	if	the	same	kind	or	even	degree	of	the	antagonism	between	Brahmins	and	the	untouchables.	Their	antagonism	existed	on	the	surface,	was	ambient	and	given	to	easy	mobilization,	Hindus	and	Muslims	were	thus	in	a	state	of	civil	war.	This	called	for	some	form	of	separation	of	historical	brotherhood	that	had	taken	on	a	murderous	logic.	While	the	violent	antagonism	steeped	in	separation	of	castes	was	so	complete	that	it	become	both	obvious	and	invisible.	Caste	antagonism	thus	could	only	be	managed	if	not	overcome	through	a	facing	of	different	caste	groups	within	the	same	political	horizon	and	the	recognition	of	a	historic	sovereign	order	that	had	to	be	displaced.	Whether	it	was	Muslin	nationality	or	caste,	Ambedkar’s	influential	political	pursuit	would	be	thus	overwhelmingly	agonistic	and	zealously	nonviolent.		Read	together,	Ambedkar’s	interventions	on	caste	and	Pakistan	were,	though	diametrically	opposed,	a	matter	of	the	recognition	of	separation.	For	caste,	the	principle	of	separation	remained	a	deliberate	blind	spot,	which	he	undertook	to	illuminate,	summoning	up	history,	social	practice	and	the	issue	of	deeply	embedded	violence.	By	contrast,	Hindus	and	Muslims	were	often	described	as	and	recognized	as	a	union	or	a	fraternity,	but	according	to	him	this	was	merely	‘display’.58	A	sense	of	mutual	‘antagonism,’	he	concluded,	was	the	essential	form	of	this	relationship,	which	would	constantly	come	to	the	surface	in	a	‘common	theatre.’	‘It	is	the	common	theatre’	–	that	is,	united	India	itself	–	he	argued,	‘which	calls	this	antagonism	into	action.’	‘Pakistan’	thus	had	the	‘advantage’	of	‘defanging’	the	antagonism	by	excluding	the	possibility	of	a	common	platform	that	was	both	the	site	and	the	cause	of	deadly	confrontation.	
																																																								58	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	339-	341.	
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Pakistan	offered	the	possibility	of	removing	this	‘disturbance	of	the	peace’	and	ensuring	an	enduring	‘tranquility’	through	the	separation	of	the	antagonists.	Critiquing	the	Hindutva	ideologues’	hostility	to	the	creation	of	Pakistan,	Ambedkar	directly	reintroduced	the	question	of	caste.59		Dismissing	Har	Dayal,	whom	he	categorized	not	as	an	anarchist	or	a	revolutionary	but	as	part	of	the	ideological	world	of	Hindutva,	he	chastised	him	for	his	views	on	Muslim	conversion	or	what	was	termed	as	‘shuddhi’	[reconversion/purification].60	In	other	words,	he	dismissed	the	Hindutva	desire	to	incorporate	the	Muslim	as	Hindu	on	the	basis	not	of	religion	but	of	caste	itself.	The	Hindutva	idea	of	‘assimilation’,	he	reminded	Har	Dayal	and	others,	was	an	affront	to	Hinduism	itself	since	‘caste	is	incompatible	with	conversion.’	More	stridently,	he	ironically	identified	Savarkar’s	claims	to	be	compatible	with	the	idea	of	Pakistan	itself.	If,	according	to	Savarkar’s	assertion,	‘Hindus	are	a	nation	by	themselves,’	Ambedkar	argued	that	‘this	of	course	means	that	the	Muslims	are	a	separate	nation	by	themselves.’61	In	fact,	precisely	because	of	their	belief	in	the	existence	of	the	Hindu	and	Muslim	nations	in	India,	Ambedkar	surmised	that	Jinnah	and	Savarkar,	were	alike	and	in	agreement.	The	key	difference	was	separation	and	violence,	once	again.	Jinnah,	he	averred,	wanted	separation.	Of	the	Hindutva	proponents,	on	the	other	hand,	he	wrote,	Mr.	Savarkar…wants	Hindus	and	the	Muslims	to	live	two	separate	nations,	in	one	country,	each	maintaining	its	own	religion,	language	and	culture.	One	can	understand	and	even	appreciate	the	wisdom…because	the	ultimate	aim	is	to	bring	into	being	one	nation...	One	can	justify	this	attitude	only	if	the	two	nations	were	to	live	as	partners	in	friendly	intercourse	with	mutual	respect	and	accord.	But	that	it	cannot	be,	because	Mr.	Savarkar	will	not	allow	the	Muslim	nation	to	be	co-equal…he	wants	the	Hindu	nation	to	be	the	dominant	nation	and	the	Muslim	nation	to	be	the	servient	[sic!]	nation.	Why	Mr.	Savarkar,	after	sowing	the	seed	of	enmity	between	the	Hindu	nation	and	Muslim	nation	should	want	that	
																																																								59	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	336-43	and	129-33.		60	On	Hindu	nationalism	see	Blom	Hansen,	Wages	of	Violence,	and	Gupta,	
Sexuality,	Obscenity,	Community.	61	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	130	and	141.	
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they	should	live	under	one	constitution	and	occupy	one	country	is	difficult	to	explain.62	These	were	not	stray	or	hapless	remarks.	Through	a	discussion	of	territory	and	nationality,	Ambedkar	had	taken	full	account	of	raging	polemics,	party	positions	and	constitutional	considerations.	The	separation	of	caste	though	immanent	had	rendered	the	Hindu	social	as	an	asocial	body	politic.	Confronting	that	fact	and	ensuring	the	proper	relation	between	castes	had	the	potentiality	of	converting	a	separation	that	was	singular	to	India	into	a	political	union.	‘Unity’	or	‘the	people’	or	popular	sovereignty,	Ambedkar	astutely	realized,	was	contained	within	the	national	form.63		The	central	issue	was	the	problem	of	hostility	and	antagonism	and	its	correct	recognition	for	a	nonviolent	and	even	peaceful	emergence	of	a	new	politics.	His	recognition	of	Pakistan	was	constitutive	of	an	agonistic	politics	that	took	two	mutually	constitutive	directions.	Whether	it	was	the	antagonism	of	caste	or	of	religion,	he	sought	to	convert	that	relationship,	without	the	erasure	of	those	fundamental	differences,	into	an	adversarial	relationship,	which	would	become	peaceful.	One	dimension	required	the	recognition	of	separation,	namely	Muslim	nationality,	and	the	other,	the	end	of	separation	namely	a	compact	between	castes.	The	overall	concern	that	emerges	in	the	totality	of	Ambedkar’s	writing	is	the	making	of	‘people’	as	the	subject	of	politics.	More	precisely,	he	sought	the	correct	‘container’	for	an	expression	of	popular	sovereignty	and	as	such	his	was	a	radical	republican	project.		In	a	major	departure	from	the	subject	oriented-political	thought	and	practice	of	Gandhi,	or	even	Tilak,	that	had	located	sovereignty	in	the	individual	subject,	for	Ambedkar	its	rightful	place	was	with	the	general	will.	Ironically,	the	work	of	separation,	in	its	full	measure,	enabled	the	philosophical	discovery	of	the	general	will	or	a	true	popular	sovereignty.64	Both	the	nature	of	caste	and	the	recent	but	deadly	antagonism	between	Hindus	and	Muslims	called	for	the																																																									62	Ambedkar,	Pakistan,	144.	He	further	warned	that	the	international	examples	such	a	Turkey,	Czechoslovakia	and	Austria	that	were	approvingly	cited	by	Savarkar	only	illustrated	the	problem	of	separation.	63	Mouffe,	Democratic	Paradox,	38-43,	critically	examines	Carl	Schmitt’s	work	on	antagonism	and	parliamentary	democracy.		64	Devji,	The	Impossible	Indian;	and	Kapila,	‘A	History	of	Violence’.	
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recognition	of	violence	and	hostility.	But	in	Ambedkar’s	case,	this	was	not	for	an	ethical	resolution	or	personal	transformation,	but	for	the	institution	of	nonviolent	politics.	The	existence	of	enemies	and	antagonists,	in	distinction	to	Gandhi,	offered	for	him	not	the	opportunity	for	self-transformation,	but	the	conversion	of	those	relations	into	agonistic	politics.		As	such,	the	destruction	of	the	dispersed	monarchy	of	the	Brahmin	and	the	recognition	of	Muslim	nationality	were	two	sides	of	the	same	political	consideration.	The	conversion	of	violence	and	hostility	into	the	nonviolent	separation	of	historical	brothers	and	the	assumption	of	a	new	fraternity	--	though	not	entirely	recognized	today	as	Ambedkar’s	political	thought	and	work	--	above	all	laid	the	foundations	for	the	assumption	of	not	one	but	two	agonistic	republics.		
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